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ABSTRACT
Some markets require legislation in order to exist. The products and/or services offered by those
markets may be covered by one or more letters patent. In certain of those markets, a situation arises
in which a private party owns a right to exclude others from participating in that publicly-enabled
market. These situations may be referred to “public standards.” Like their cousins in the private sector,
public standards require special consideration when it comes to determining potential compensation
to the patentee from its competitors. Following the lead of the Western District of Washington, this
paper recommends a modification of the traditional Georgia-Pacific reasonable royalty formulation for
a patent damages calculation. Specifically, this paper recommends that calculating damages for public
standard patents should require an explicit, thorough consideration of the public interest in addition
to the patents themselves and the relationship of the involved parties. Only then will the interests of
the public be adequately protected.
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PUBLIC STANDARDS AND PATENT DAMAGES
BEN JOHNSON1*
I. INTRODUCTION
Within five years, 20% of automobile insurance policies will be covered by patents
owned by a handful of companies. 2 These patents have thus far resisted challenges by
some of the largest insurance carriers in the country. 3,4 The holders of these patents
have the right to burdensome licensing fees from their competitors,5 threatening to
reduce competition and consumer choice in a multi-million dollar market.6
Exclusion of competition is part and parcel of the patent system, but the situation
with auto insurance differs from most other markets in one key way: insurance
products, like oil and gas products and tax strategies, are to some extent the creation
of public law. These products may be thought of as “public standards.” This difference
should be paramount in any determination of the market entry cost comprising patent
infringement damages.
The most common form of damages calculation is known as a “reasonable royalty”
calculation.7 This paper argues that public standards should follow the lead of a recent
decision in the electronics industry and tailor the reasonable royalty calculation to its
specific context. That case, Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., et al., 2013 WL 2111217
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013), tailored the analysis for products incorporating one or

© Ben Johnson 2015. Ben Johnson is currently Patent Counsel at Freescale Semiconductor Inc. 1
The view and opinions contained within this paper are those of the author alone and do not
represent those of his any employer and/or client, past or present.
2 The National Association of Insurance Commissioners reports that “industry experts predict
that . . 20 percent of all vehicle insurance in the U.S. [is] expected to incorporate some form of [usagebased insurance] within five years.” Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs & The Center for Ins. Policy and
Research,
Usage-Based
Insurance
and
Telematics,
http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_usage_based_insurance.htm. See Section II, infra, for a
discussion of the relevant patents.
3 Progressive has filed suit against Safeco and Liberty Mutual, Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v.
Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill. et al., case no. 1:10-cv-01370-BYP (N.D. Ohio (June 18, 2010), Allstate,
Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co. et al., case no. 1:11-cv-00082-BYP (N.D. Ohio Jan.
12, 2011), Hartford, Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. et al., case no. 1:12-cv01070-BYP (N.D. Ohio Apr. 30, 2012), and State Farm, Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. State Farm
Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., case no. 1:12-cv-01068-BYP (N.D. Ohio Apr. 30, 2012), among others. All four
cases were administratively closed in April 2013 pending the outcome of a reexamination proceeding
against the patent-at-issue.
4 See generally infra Section II.A discussing the Progressive patent portfolio. U.S. Patent No.
6,064,970 (Progressive’s parent patent) was the subject of ex parte reexamination. Reexamination No.
90/011,252. The reexamination certificate issued Jan. 4, 2012.
5 See generally Section III infra.
6 See note 1 for an estimate of the potential size of the usage-based insurance market.
7 William O. Kerr & Gauri Prakesh-Canjels, Patent Damages and Royalty Awards: The
Convergence of Economics and Law, LES NOUVELLES: JOURNAL OF LICENSING EXECUTIVES SOCIETY
(June 2003). In April 2009, an updated version of this paper was published at
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/76748/Patent/Patent+Damages+And+Royalty+Awards+The
+Convergence+Of+Economics+And+Law.
*
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more technology standards (e.g., universal serial bus (“USB”); 8 802.11, the standard
specifying the implementation of wireless networks; 9 etc.). These technology standards
may be thought of as “private standards.”
For public standards, the tailoring should focus on protecting the public interest.
Part II of this paper introduces the idea of a public standard and uses the example of
usage-based insurance to demonstrate the ability of a relatively small number of
patents to occupy a public standard market. Part III surveys patent damages law,
focusing on the reasonable royalty/“hypothetical negotiation” analysis common to
private standard litigation. Part IV explores how the “hypothetical negotiation”
analysis should be adapted to public standards. Finally, Part V briefly discusses some
other considerations associated with public standards and the focus on the public
interest.
II. PUBLIC STANDARDS
A public standard may be thought of as any product or service whose ability to be
sold to the public depends specifically on a law, regulation, or a set of laws or
regulations. Public standards stand in contrast to products that are merely regulated.
For example, the Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”) regulates thousands
of consumer products ranging from toys to coffee makers in order to protect the
public.10 However, the regulations promulgated by the CPSC and other agencies
typically concern things like product information and labeling. 11 For most consumer
products, regulation does not reach the level of enabling the existence of a product.12
This is not the case for public standards.
Markets for public standard products require enabling legislation for their
existence. This section examines three such markets: automobile insurance, tax
practice, and oil and gas products. The first offers a broad view into the patent issues
facing public standards and is treated with some depth. The latter two are summarized
briefly to provide further context.
A. Automobile Insurance
Automobile insurance holds a curious place in the regulatory landscape. Although
rather clearly within the ambit of Congress’s interstate commerce powers, 13 Congress
8 USB is an inter-device communication standard promulgated by the USB Implementers Forum.
USB.org, USB 3.1 Specification, http://www.usb.org/developers/docs/.
9 802.11 is a wireless communication standard promulgated by the Institute of Electrical &
Electronics
Engineers
(“IEEE”).
IEEE,
IEEE
Get
Program,
http://standards.ieee.org/about/get/802/802.11.html. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., et al., 2013 WL
2111217, (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013).
10 E.g., Consumer Product Safety Commission, About CPSC, http://www.cpsc.gov/en/AboutCPSC/.
11 E.g., 16 C.F.R. § 1500.19 - Misbranded toys and other articles intended for use by children.
12 Exceptions include pharmaceuticals, 21 U.S.C. § 360 (requiring the registration of producers of
drugs or devices).
13 See 15 U.S.C. § 1013(a) (“Until June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as
the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the

[14:199 2015] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

202

has expressly disavowed federal regulation.14 In 1945, Congress passed the McCarrenFerguson Act, declaring that “the continued regulation and taxation by the several
States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the
part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or
taxation of such business by the several States.” 15 Thus, each state acts within their
own sphere to decide which insurance products to allow and the rules that apply to
each.16
Usage-based insurance products, a relatively new creation, have been approved
by most, but not all, of the states (Texas was among the first, Illinois one of the most
recent, and California has yet to come aboard). 17 Generally, “usage-based insurance”
refers to any insurance product with a cost tied directly to the insurer’s behavior while
operating a vehicle.18 This paper uses the term “usage-based insurance” to encompass
a variety of products that come in a variety of flavors. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to detail them all, but an overview of the two major categories provides context
for the remaining analysis. Those two categories are: (1) term products that rely on
usage data to alter a base rate of insurance; and (2) products that price a unit of
insurance based on something other than time. An example of the first category is
Progressive’s “Snapshot” product;19 the products offered by the now-defunct MileMeter
are an example of the second.20
The following sections describe the patent portfolios protecting each product. They
will demonstrate the depth and breadth of coverage these two companies retain over a
burgeoning industry.
1. Snapshot by Progressive
Snapshot by Progressive allows an insured to install a small electronic device in
the on-board diagnostics port standard in modern vehicles.21 The current version of
this port, termed “ODBII,” allows communication between a device plugged into the
port and the on-board computer within the vehicle.22 The computer may communicate
Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act [15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.], and
the Act of June 19, 1936, known as the Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act, shall not apply to
the business of insurance or to acts in the conduct thereof.”).
14 Id.
15 15 U.S.C. § 1011.
16 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (“The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be
subject to the laws of the several States which relation to the regulation or taxation of such business.”).
17 California is one of the seven states listed by Progressive in which Snapshot is unavailable.
Progressive Agent, Snapshot FAQs, http://www.progressiveagent.com/auto/snapshot-faqs.aspx, (last
accessed Jan. 24, 2015).
18 See generally Jason E. Bordoff & Pascal J. Noel, Pay-As-You-Drive Auto Insurance: A Simple
Way to Reduce Driving-Related Harms and Increase Equity, THE HAMILTON PROJECT (Brooking
Institute, July 2008).
19
See
Progressive
Corp.,
Snapshot
Common
Questions,
http://www.progressive.com/auto/snapshot-common-questions/.
20 See infra notes 51–57.
21 Progressive Corp., Snapshot Common Questions, http://www.progressive.com/auto/snapshotcommon-questions/.
22 California Environmental Protection Agency, Air Resources Board, On-Board Diagnostics
(OBD) Program, http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/obdprog/obdprog.htm.
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a variety of data to the ODBII port, including mileage, velocity, and diagnostic
messages.23 For example, it is the ODBII port that allows mechanics to identify a
particular one of the myriad issues that may trigger a vehicle’s “check engine” light. 24
The Snapshot device captures mileage, velocity, and other data from the vehicle’s
on-board computer for later communication to a central server for analysis. 25
Progressive then uses the collected data to calculate a discount (or theoretically, a
premium) to the cost of insurance.26 In some respects, Snapshot is similar to programs
offered by other insurers such as National General Insurance. 27 National General
offers a “Low-Mileage Discount” available to OnStar subscribers in 35 states. 28 Like
Snapshot, National General uses a telematics device (in their case, the OnStar
system)29 to track the number of miles driven in a premium period.30 The mileage value
is then used to calculate a discount to the base insurance rate. 31
Snapshot and other telematics-based programs have been somewhat
controversial, with consumers expressing concern over the use of such data,
particularly when combined with a time stamp and/or location-identifying technology
(e.g., GPS).32 Even with these concerns, Progressive has extended the program from
nine states in 200933 to more than 44 in 2013.34
Although the intricacies of the Snapshot program are not publicly available, the
methods embodied in Progressive’s patent portfolio provide some insight. Progressive’s
usage-based portfolio consists of a family of six patents. The parent of the family is
U.S. Patent No. 5,797,134 (“the ʼ134 Patent”). Progressive filed for the ʼ134 Patent on
January 29, 1996, and the ʼ134 Patent issued August 18, 1998. 35 The ʼ134 Patent
broadly claims a method of adjusting a cost of insuring a vehicle based on data
gathered from the insured. Claim 1 states:
1. A method of determining a cost of automobile insurance for a selected
period based upon monitoring, recording and communicating data
Id.
Id.
25 Progressive Corp., Snapshot Common Questions, http://www.progressive.com/auto/snapshotcommon-questions/.
26 Id.
27 National General Insurance was formerly known as GMAC Insurance. GMAC Insurance
Changes Name to National General Insurance Effective July 1, Business Wire, June 13, 2013,
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20130613005198/en/GMAC-Insurance-National-GeneralInsurance-Effective-July#.VEFNf010yUk.
28
National General Insurance, National General Insurance Low-Mileage Discount,
http://www.nationalgeneral.com/auto-insurance/smart-discounts/low-mileage-discount.asp.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 E.g., Jessica Schley, Bill Spurs Privacy Concern, Ventura County Star, Aug. 6, 2008,
http://www.vcstar.com/news/pay-as-you-drive-insurance-spurs-big-brother.
33
Progressive
Corp.,
Question
About
MyRate,
formerly
available
at
http://www.progressive.com/myrate/myrate-faq.aspx. An uncertified historical version of this website
may
be
found
at
http://web.archive.org/web/20090122220027/http://www.progressive.com/myrate/myrate-faq.aspx.
34 Progressive Corp., Snapshot Common Questions, http://www.progressive.com/auto/snapshotcommon-questions/.
35 U.S. Patent No. 5,797,134 (“the ’134 Patent”).
23
24
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representative of operator and vehicle driving characteristics during said
period, whereby the cost is adjustable by relating the driving characteristics
to predetermined safety standards, the method comprising:
determining an initial insured profile and a base cost of automobile insurance
based on said insured profile;
monitoring a plurality of data elements representative of an operating state
of a vehicle or an action of the operator during the selected period;
recording selected ones of the plurality of data elements when said ones are
determined to have a preselected relationship to the safety standards;
consolidating said selected ones for identifying a surcharge or discount to be
applied to the base cost; and,
producing a final cost of automobile insurance for the selected period from
the base cost and the surcharge or discount.36
Claim 1 illustrates the breadth of the Progressive patents. A competitor could
infringe the ʼ134 Patent by using a range of “data elements representative of an
operating state of a vehicle;”37 using any type of device for “recording selected . . . data
elements;”38 and calculating the “final cost of automobile insurance” for any “selected
period.”39
The ʼ134 Patent is accompanied by a family of five other patents, 40 detailed in the
table below. While not all of these patents have been asserted in litigation, 41
Progressive has stated that all are available for a standard licensing fee. 42

ʼ134 Patent, 11:34–53.
Id. at 11:42–44.
38 Id. at 11:46–48.
39 Id. at 11:51–53.
40 In addition to the patents listed, the Progressive portfolio also includes U.S. Patent Application
No. 13/617,929, published Jan. 10, 2013 under Publication No. 2013/0013347.
41 Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill. et al., case no. 1:10-cv-01370-BYP, Docket
No. 64 (N.D. Ohio (June 18, 2010); Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co. et al., case no.
1:11-cv-00082-BYP, Docket No. 6 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 12, 2011); Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. et al., case no. 1:12-cv-01070-BYP, Docket No. 1 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 30, 2012); and
Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., case no. 1:12-cv-01068-BYP, Docket
No. 4 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 30, 2012).
42 Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., Progressive Announces Terms for Usage-Based Insurance
Licensing Program, http://www.progressive.com/newsroom/article/2012/December/ubi-licensing/ (last
visited Oct. 13, 2013).
36
37
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TABLE 1
Patent
No.

Filing
Date

Issue
Date

Title

5,797,134

1/29/1996

8/18/1998

6,064,970
(“the ’970
Patent”)
6,868,386
(“the ’386
Patent”)

08/17/1998

05/16/2000

05/15/2000

03/15/2005

8,090,598
(“the ’598
Patent”)

01/23/2004

01/03/2012

8,140,358
(“the ’358
Patent”)
8,311,858
(“the ’858
Patent”)

06/03/2008

03/20/2012

“Monitoring system for
determining and
communicating a cost of
insurance”
“Vehicle Monitoring System”

02/17/2012

11/13/2012

“Vehicle Monitoring System”

“Motor vehicle monitoring
system for determining a
cost of insurance”
“Motor vehicle monitoring
system for determining a
cost of insurance”
“Monitoring system for
determining and
communicating a cost of
insurance”

The remaining patents in the Progressive portfolio expand on the general data
collection/insurance cost calculation claimed in the ʼ134 Patent. The ʼ970 Patent—the
patent most often asserted in litigation43—details further how Progressive may use the
collected data.44 The ʼ386 and ʼ598 Patents cover the communication of data from a
user to an insurance company.45 In the era of online insurance servicing—an area
which Progressive trumpets as one of its business differentiators 46—it may be
See supra note 41.
E.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,064,970, 12:26–39 (Claim 6):
6. A method of monitoring a human controlled power source driven vehicle, the method
comprising:
extracting one or more data elements from at least one sensor wherein the one or more elements
are of at least one operating state of the vehicle and the at least one human's actions during a data
collection period;
analyzing, grouping, and storing the one or more data elements as group data values in a first
memory related to a predetermined group of elements; and,
correlating the group data values to preset values in a second memory and generating an output
data value based on the correlation wherein the output data value is used to compute an insurance
rating for the vehicle FOR the data collection period.
45 E.g., ʼ386 Patent, 13:60–14:5; ʼ598 Patent, 28:22–49.
46 Progressive Corp., Customer Service, http://www.progressive.com/online-customer-service/.
43
44
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extremely difficult for any competitor to offer a usage-based insurance product without
providing the types of internet-based customer feedback claimed by the ʼ386 and ʼ598
Patents. The customer’s ability to visualize how her driving habits impact her cost of
insurance is one of the advantages of usage-based products.47
Beyond usage data gathering, analysis, and communication, the Progressive
portfolio also carves out a space in the hardware side—the telematics units required
for gathering the data from an insured. The patent landscape for telematics devices is
quite crowded.48 To avoid as much of this prior work as possible, the Progressive
patents claim the use of a device in combination with other features. For example, the
ʼ358 Patent claims: (1) a “processor that collects vehicle data from a vehicle bus,” (2) a
“wireless transmitter” to transmit the data, (3) a networked database gathering the
data, and (4) a server to do the analytical heavy lifting.49
2. MileMeter
MileMeter was a Texas start-up company offering a pre-paid, insure-by-the-mile
product.50 MileMeter’s products were primarily marketed toward college students
residing on campus, retirees, mass transit users, and others who may have an
occasional need for a vehicle.51 MileMeter explicitly distinguished its products from
those that used vehicle tracking and/or credits to a traditional insurance premium by
only using the actual mileage driven by the insured.52,53 MileMeter gathered this data
either from publicly available records (e.g., automobile inspection records) or from the
insured’s self-reporting.
The MileMeter patent portfolio consists of four issued patents detailed below in
Table 2. U.S. Patent No. 7,865,378 (“the ʼ378 Patent”) is the parent of the patent
family. The heart of the ʼ378 Patent is a method for calculating a cost of insurance.
47 See ʼ134 Patent, 3:42–60 (“Additionally, the present invention allows for frequent (monthly)
adjustment to the cost of coverage because of the changes in operator behavior and driving patterns.
This can result in automobile insurance charges that are readily controllable by individual
operators.”); Jason E. Bordoff & Pascal J. Noel, Pay-As-You-Drive Auto Insurance: A Simple Way to
Reduce Driving-Related Harms and Increase Equity, THE HAMILTON PROJECT (Brookings Institute
July 2008)
48 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,140,358, pp. 1–6 (citing six pages, double-columned, of relevant
references cited to the Examiner).
49 ʼ358 Patent, 41:56–42:13 (Claim 1). See also, U.S. Patent No. 8,311,858, 41:63–42:16 (claiming
an “in-vehicle monitor that filters data by selectively polling one or more in-vehicle controllers,” invehicle memory that “retains relationship data that links the selected vehicle data to a vehicle
identifier and a wireless network,” a “wireless transceiver,” and a second receiver to “receive
continuously transmitted trilateral encoded signals.”).
50 See, e.g., Sheryl Jean, MileMeter Morphs Into Zengine, DALLAS MORNING NEWS BIZ BEAT BLOG,
Apr. 3, 2012, http://bizbeatblog.dallasnews.com/2012/04/post-2.html/.
51 See, e.g., id.; see also MileMeter, http://www.milemeter.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2009).
MileMeter ceased operation in 2012. It is no longer accepting new customers and the website remains
functional only to service existing customer. An uncertified copy of the site is available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20090121133341/http://milemeter.com/.
52 E.g., STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPT. OF INSURANCE, Transcript of Public Hearing on Pay-Drive
(Usage-Based Auto Insurance), Oct. 20, 2008, pp. 11–18.
53 MileMeter FAQ, http://www.milemeter.com/faq (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). See supra note 51
regarding the general availability of the MileMeter website.
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The steps of the method are: (1) receive an odometer reading, and (2) provide a quote
to the customer based on a “cost per distance unit” for a certain number of distance
units.54 The remaining patents are relatively minor variations on the same theme.55

Patent No.

Filing

TABLE 2
Issue

Title

Date

Date

7,865,378
(“the ’378
Patent”)

10/29/2004

01/04/2011

“System and Method for the
Assessment, Pricing, and
Provisioning of Distance-Based
Vehicle Insurance”

7,890,355
(“the ’355
Patent”)

11/27/2006

02/15/2011

“System and Method for the
Assessment, Pricing, and
Provisioning of Distance-Based
Vehicle Insurance”

54 35 U.S.C. § 101 requires that, in order for an invention to be eligible for patent protection, it
must qualify as a “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. See also Bilski v. Kappos,
561 U.S. 593, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). As a result of the ever-evolving jurisprudence of § 101, a patentee
occasionally must resort to couching claim limitations in a particular structure. For example, the U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office considers software to be per se unpatentable. MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURES § 2106. The claims of the ʼ378 Patent are illustrative of this practice. The
full text of Claim 1 of the ʼ378 Patent recites:
1. A computer system for assessing, pricing, and provisioning distance-based vehicle insurance,
the system comprising:
a computer processor; and
a computer memory accessible to the computer processor, the computer memory and computer
processor being communicatively detached from a customer associated vehicle, wherein the computer
memory comprises a plurality of instructions which, when executed by the computer processor,
perform a method, the method comprising:
receiving a current odometer reading of the vehicle from the customer, wherein the odometer is
the factory installed odometer and is representative of the original miles traveled by the vehicle;
providing a plurality of coverage types to the customer;
providing the customer with at least one quote upon receiving an input selecting one of the
coverage types, wherein the quote includes a policy rate identifying a cost per distance unit based on
the customer and vehicle identification information;
providing the customer with a plurality of pre-calculated items based on the quote, wherein each
item includes a total number of distance units for purchase at the policy rate; and
performing a purchase transaction for an insurance policy in response to input from the customer
electing one of the items for purchase, wherein coverage provided by the insurance policy is based on
an expiration odometer value defined as the sum of the current odometer reading and the local number
of distance units included in the selected item, and wherein the current odometer reading is not
audited prior to or during the purchase transaction.
‘378 Patent, 10:56–11:22 (Claim 1).
55 E.g., compare ʼ378 Patent, 10:56–11:22 with ʼ355 Patent, 14:32–15:3.
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7,991,629
(“the ’629
Patent”)

03/14/2007

08/02/2011

7,987,103
(“the ’103
Patent”)

04/23/2007

07/26/2011

208

“System and Method for the
Assessment, Pricing, and
Provisioning of Distance-Based
Vehicle Insurance”
“System and Method for the
Assessment, Pricing, and
Provisioning of Distance-Based
Vehicle Insurance”

Despite its patent portfolio and potential for profitability, MileMeter was unable
to withstand the combined pressures of much larger competitors and a bad economy
that made it difficult to grow.56 MileMeter ceased operation in 2012, although it
continues to service existing customers. 57
B. Usage-Based Insurance Going Forward
The above analysis is intended to give an idea of the depth and breadth of patent
protection in the usage-based insurance market. Any insurance provider, large or
small, new or established, will face a high barrier to entry in the form of increased
costs.
If a competitor chooses to fight the patents in the courts or the Patent Office, the
road is long and the expense high: the cost of patent litigation runs in the millions of
dollars, even for relatively small damages amounts. 58 This is before any settlement is
negotiated or trial damages calculated. Progressive offered another option for potential
competitors.
In December 2012, Progressive announced a licensing program for its usage-based
insurance patent portfolio.59 By its terms, a licensee must: (1) pay 0.02% of all “Private
Passenger Auto direct written premiums for the most recently reported year” and (2)
not sell any usage-based insurance products before April 1, 2015. 60 The license runs
through April 2022,61 and signup for the license closed in June 2013.62

56 See, e.g., Sheryl Jean, MileMeter Morphs Into Zengine, DALLAS MORNING NEWS BIZ BEAT BLOG,
Apr. 3, 2012, http://bizbeatblog.dallasnews.com/2012/04/post-2.html/.
57 MileMeter, http://www.milemeter.com. Please note that this citation is to the existing version
of the MileMeter website. See supra note 51 regarding the general availability of the MileMeter
website.
58 AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOC., 2013 Report of the Economic Survey.
59 Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., Progressive Announces Terms for Usage-Based Insurance
Licensing Program, http://www.progressive.com/newsroom/article/2012/December/ubi-licensing/ (last
visited Oct. 13, 2013).
60 Id.
61 The author only has access to the publicly available terms of the license. One of the difficulties
with the lack of information about the license itself is the term. The ‘134 Patent is set to expire in
2016 and the ‘970 Patent is set to expire in 2017. It is unclear how the license is structured to deal
with the expiration of the constituent patents.
62 See supra note 58.
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It appears from news reports that only United Services Automobile Association
(“USAA”) took advantage of this offer.63 At the stated royalty rate of 0.02%, this may
only cost USAA between $1.5 and $2 million per year. 64 However, USAA forfeits any
ability to offer usage-based insurance products until 2015. 65 USAA must therefore pay
Progressive somewhere around $4 million before it ever sells a single usage-based
insurance product. This is presumably less than the license fee paid by Allstate Fire &
Casualty Insurance Co. (“Allstate”) to settle its long-running litigation with
Progressive.66 Progressive’s goal appears to be to position itself as the market leader,
relying on a first mover-type advantage to offset any potential losses from its patent
portfolio.
Regardless of its motives, the window for competitors to sign up for Progressive’s
license has closed.67 For companies other than Allstate and USAA, the only options
that remain are to seek a license from Progressive (presumably at less favorable terms)
or to litigate the patents in court. 68 For the new entrant into the world of usage-based
insurance, there are no inexpensive options.
Progressive’s patent portfolio differentiates usage-based insurance from other
insurance products. Typically, the regulatory framework enabling insurance products
works to provide predictability and clarity to new market entrants. If you want to offer
car insurance, you must simply meet the rules and regulations laid out by the relevant
Department of Insurance. Of course, there are business-related barriers to entry. State
Farm, Allstate, Progressive, and others have been around for a long time and have
economies of scale and much larger advertising budgets. But if all one needs is the
legal-minimum level of insurance, one need not go to one of the more established
companies.
Insurance companies have, to this point, differentiated themselves on typical
business-side aspects: customer service, focus on a particular market, cost, etc. 69 But
with usage-based insurance, there is now an unpredictable, specific, significant cost to
offering a legislation-enabled product. Small insurance companies may not be able to
meet the licensing terms demanded by patent holders.

63 Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., Progressive Insurance and United Services Automobile
Association
(USAA)
Enter
License
Agreement
for
Usage-Based
Insurance,
http://www.progressive.com/newsroom/article/2013/June/usaa-ubi/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
64 See Insurance Journal, Progressive to License Usage-Based Pricing Tool to USAA, July 1, 2013
(reporting that USAA “wrote more than $8 billion in 2012 auto premiums”).
65 See supra note 58.
66 Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., Progressive Settles Patent Dispute with Allstate,
http://www.progressive.com/newsroom/article/2011/October/patent-dispute/ (last visited Oct. 13,
2013). No terms of the license were disclosed.
67 See supra note 58.
68 As discussed in Section III.A infra, one of the components in determining a reasonable royalty
calculation for patent litigation damages is looking at licenses that have been negotiated between
similar parties for the same or similar patents. Although beyond the scope of this paper, it would be
interesting to see how courts view Progressive’s license offer in terms of being a comparable royalty.
69 E.g., Progressive Corp., Auto Insurance, http://www.progressive.com/auto/; Allstate, Auto
Insurance & Car Insurance Quotes—Allstate, http://www.allstate.com/auto-insurance.aspx.
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C. Other Public Standard Markets
Tax practice, and oil and gas products, two other public standard markets, have
previously encountered a patent problem. Both have lessons for the future of patents
in public standard markets.
1. Patenting Tax Strategies
In 2006, a patentee sued a tax lawyer for infringement of U.S. Patent No.
6,567,790 that describes “an estate planning method for minimizing transfer tax
liability with respect to the transfer of the value of stock options from a holder of stock
options to a family member of the holder.” 70 This case, and others like it, spawned a
brief cottage industry in tax patent Armageddon.71 Many articles were written arguing
that tax strategies should be specifically excluded from patentability under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.72 As a result of the uproar, tax patents were largely (if not entirely) eliminated
by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011.73
Automobile insurance patents, however, may be different from tax patents both
in policy terms and technical terms. On the technical side, electronic devices
themselves are protected subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.74 At least some of
Progressive’s patents cover physical electronic devices.75 On the policy side, there is a
difference between a patented method of practicing a public standard (i.e., a tax patent)
and a patented method preempting a public standard (i.e., a usage-based insurance
patent). The former retains the consumer benefit of competition for the optimal way to
practice a standard, while the latter does not.
However, there is something to be gained from literature surrounding tax patents,
and that is a focus on incentives. One of the arguments for the patent system is that it
is intended to provide an incentive for innovation—a time-limited right of exclusion in
exchange for inventing something new and disclosure sufficient to make it public.76

70 U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790, Abstract; Wealth Transfer Group, LLC v. Rowe, 2006 WL 434187
(D. Conn. Jan. 6, 2006).
71 E.g., Camp Announces Hearing on Issues Relating to the Patenting of Tax Advice: Advisory
from the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measure of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 109th Cong., 2d
Sess. (June 27, 2006), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg30450/pdf/CHRG109hhrg30450.pdf.
72 E.g., Brian C. Banner, Patenting Tax Strategies: The Case for Excluding Legal Methods from
the Realm of Patentable Subject Matter, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 491 (2007); Matthew A Melone,
The Patenting of Tax Strategies: A Patently Unnecessary Development, 5 DePaul Bus. & Com. L.J. 437
(2007); Anish Parikh, The Proliferation of Tax Strategy Patents: Has Patenting Gone Too Far?, 7 J.
Marshal Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 202 (2007).
73
American
Institute
of
CPAs,
Tax
Strategy
Patents,
http://www.aicpa.org/Advocacy/Issues/Pages/TaxStrategyPatents.aspx;
Leahy-Smith
American
Invents Act § 14.
74 See Bilski, supra note 53 for a brief discussion of the fine line between a patentable electronic
device and software resident on an electronic device.
75 E.g., ʼ358 Patent, 41:56–42:13.
76 See White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc., 713 F.2d 788, 791 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(“The sine qua non of a valid patent is a full, clear, enabling description of the invention.”).
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Innovations in tax avoidance strategies do not require such an incentive. 77 Arguably,
the incentive to reduce one’s tax bill is sufficient to drive the need for new, creative tax
strategies.78 That is, these inventions may come to light even in the absence of a patent
system.79
A similar focus on the incentives in creating insurance products is helpful. State
Departments of Insurance are public entities tasked with regulating the insurance
industry in order to protect the public. 80 The Departments of Insurance must mediate
competing public and private interests to craft solutions that best serve the public. 81
The patent system hasn’t been needed to incentivize these products because the
private interests involved were business-focused rather than technology-focused.
Usage-based insurance changed the dynamic by changing the focus. The ideas
behind usage-based insurance go back at least as early as the 1960s. In 1968, William
Vickrey stated that “the manner in which [automobile insurance] premiums are
computed and paid fails miserably to bring home to the automobile user the costs he
imposes in a manner that will appropriately influence his decision.” 82 As an example
of a better method, Vickrey states: “There is no real conceptual difficulty in charging
an insurance premium according to mileage; the problem is one of implementation.” 83
That is, then-current technology did not allow for accurate recording and reporting of
usage data.84 What Progressive and others eventually patented are technological
embodiments of these old ideas. 85 The difficulty is determining how to handle these
patents when they preempt a publicly-enabled market.
2. Oil & Gas
In 1991, California mandated the use of clean-burning gasoline.86 Unocal owned
U.S. Patent No. 5,288,393 (“the ʼ393 Patent”).87 The ʼ393 Patent claimed a particular
unleaded gasoline fuel that could reduce emissions “of NOx, CO and/or
hydrocarbons.”88 The ’393 Patent appeared to preempt all implementations of the

77 See generally, Brian C. Banner, Patenting Tax Strategies: The Case for Excluding Legal
Methods from the Realm of Patentable Subject Matter, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 491 (2007).
78 Id.at 497–500.
79 Id.
80 See, e.g., TEX. INS. CODE § 31.002 (“In addition to the other duties required of the Texas
Department of Insurance, the department shall . . . protect and ensure the fair treatment of
consumers; and ensure fair competition in the insurance industry in order to foster a competitive
market.”) (internal enumeration omitted).
81 Id.
82 Williams Vickrey, Automobile Accidents, Tort Law, Externalities, & Insurance: An Economist’s
Critique, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 464, 470 (1968).
83 Id. at 471–2.
84 Id. at 472.
85 See, e.g. supra note 39 and accompanying text.
86 News Release, Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency, California Air Resources Board Orders World’s
Cleanest Burning Gasoline (Nov. 22, 1991), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/nr112291.htm
(last visited Oct. 13, 2013); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § § 2260–76 (2002).
87 U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Assignment Records, Reel No. 005561, Frame No. 0913.
88 U.S. Patent No. 5,288,393, Abstract.
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regulations.89 Unocal sought royalties from its competitors of about 5.75 cents a
gallon.90 Unocal waged a long legal battle to defend its patent and its licensing practice
despite heavy public criticism. 91,92 Eventually, the case settled as a result of Unocal’s
merger with Chevron.93 Thereafter, Chevron agreed not to enforce the patents. 94
This is an example of what can occur when a single entity, through its patents,
preempts a public standard. In this case the preemption was mitigated when Unocal
came under intense public pressure following an investigation into its role in drafting
the regulations that it sought to capture. 95,96
The next few sections of this paper highlight important points for calculating a
reasonable royalty for a patent that preempts a public standard market. When a public
standard patentee has sued a competitor for infringement, the patent is valid, and the
competitor has infringed, what then is the damages model? How should that number
be adjusted up or down to account for other factors?
III. PUBLIC STANDARDS AND THE REASONABLE ROYALTY
A. The Reasonable Royalty
A party infringes a patent when, without authority, that party “makes, uses, offers
to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the
United States any patent invention.”97 In order to prove infringement, a patentee must
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused party’s product or service

89 Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry Standards, 17 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 623, 625 (Spring 2002).
90 Id. at 627.
91 See Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989, 1002 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
92 Unocal’s participation in the actual passage of the pertinent regulations outraged the public.
See Julie Tamaki, Unocal Patent on Clean Fuel Stirs Outrage, L.A. Times, Oct. 9, 2000, A3.
93 Toby Eckert, Unocal Patent Dispute Settled, The San Diego Union-Tribune (June 11, 2005).
94 Id.
95 See supra note 91.
96 For the purposes of this paper, there is an assumption that no patent misuse has occurred. A
patent may be found unenforceable under the doctrine of patent misuse when a patentee uses to the
patent to “acquire a monopoly not embraced in the patent.”). Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616
F.3d 1318, 1327 (2010) (en banc) (quoting Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329
U.S. 637,643 (1947). A patent holder commits patent misuse if it: (1) “broadened the physical or
temporal scope of the patent grant,” (2) such that the “overall effect . . . tends to restrain competition
unlawfully in an appropriately defined relevant market.” Princo, 616 F.3d at 1334. Cases have argued
that the nondisclosure of pertinent patents to a standards-setting organization is grounds for patent
misuse and thus unenforceability. Arguably, Princo refutes a patent misuse challenge based on a
“patentee’s unilateral conduct, including misleading a [standards-setting organization.” Daniel J.
Matheson, Patent Misuse: The Questions That Linger Post-Princo, Am. Bar Assoc. Section of Antitrust
Law Intellectual Prop. Comm. (2011). Regardless of the accuracy of this approach, patent misuse is
beyond the scope of this paper.
97 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). There are other ways of finding a party liable as an infringer, as covered by
the remainder of 35 U.S.C. § 271. For the purposes of this discussion, it is sufficient to only consider
infringement under § 271(a).
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meets each and every limitation of a patent claim. 98 An accused party may respond to
infringement allegations with a number of affirmative defenses and/or counterclaims,
including attacks on patent validity under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03, 112.99
Upon a finding of infringement, “the court shall award the claimant damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable
royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer.” 100 A reasonable royalty,
then, is the floor for a patent damages award. Courts have defined a reasonable royalty
as “an amount ‘which a person, desiring to manufacture and sell a patented article, as
a business proposition, would be willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make
and sell the patented article, in the market, at a reasonable profit.” 101 In most
situations, the lack of an available established royalty (whether by industry standard
or an extant licensing regime by the patentee) forces courts to undergo a murky
analysis based on a “hypothetical negotiation.” 102
A hypothetical negotiation analysis typically proceeds by considering fifteen
factors first formalized by United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York in Georgia Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y
197), modified by 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). The Federal Circuit once described the
hypothetical negotiation as taking place “as if the parties negotiated at arm’s length
as a willing licensor and a willing licensee on the date when the infringement began.” 103
The characterization of the hypothetical negotiation doctrine as between a
“willing licensor and a willing licensee” has not aged well. The Federal Circuit has
called the “willing licensor-willing licensee” characterization “absurd,” and notes that
the use of such a model “for determining damages ‘risks creation of the perception that
blatant, blind appropriation of inventions by individual, nonmanufacturing inventors
is the profitable, can’t-lose course.’”104 To “avoid such a result,” the Federal Circuit

98 Proving patent infringement is a two-step process. The first step, often referred to as “claim
construction,” involves interpreting the terms of a patent claim to establish their breadth. The second
step involves a comparison of the accused product or service with the interpreted claim. See, e.g.,
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). The comparison in the
second step is either a literal comparison or one under the Doctrine of Equivalents. See Graver Tank
& Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
99 Traditionally, there are five requirements for patentability: (1) patentable subject matter, 35
U.S.C. §101; Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); (2) utility, 35 U.S.C. § 101; In re Brana, 51 F.3d
1560, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1995); (3) novelty, 35 U.S.C. § 102; (4) nonobviousness, 35 U.S.C. § 103; and (5)
sufficient disclosure, 35 U.S.C. § 112.
100 35 U.S.C. § 284.
101 Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1157–58 (6th Cir. 1978)
(quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Overman Cushion Tire Co., 95 F.2d 978, 984 (6th Cir. 1937)
(citing Rockwood v. General Fire Extinguisher Co., 37 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1930)), appeal dismissed
on motion of counsel for petitioners, 306 U.S. 665 (1938).
102 See generally Georgia Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
modified by 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
103 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing State Indus. v.
Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
104 Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting Fromson v. Western
Litoh Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by KnorrBremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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suggests application of the Georgia Pacific factors.105 This may involve modifying a
royalty rate in order to “do justice” to the patentee.106
The factors enumerated by the Georgia-Pacific court are listed below. Not all
factors may be applicable in every case, and the Federal Circuit has noted that the list
is “comprehensive (but unprioritized and often overlapping).”107
1. Georgia-Pacific Factors108
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in
suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty.
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to
the patent in suit.
3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as
restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the
manufactured product may be sold.
4. The licensor's established policy and marketing program to maintain his
patent monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting
licenses under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.
5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as,
whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of
business; or whether they are inventor and promoter.
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other
products of the licensee; that existing value of the invention to the licensor as
a generator of sales of his non-patented items; and the extent of such
derivative or convoyed sales.
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license.
8. The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its
commercial success; and its current popularity.
9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or
devices, if any, that had been used for working out similar results.

Maxwell, 86 F.3d at 1109.
See TWM Mfg. v. Dura Cop., 789 F.2d 895, 900 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating that “[t]he willing
licensee/licensor approach must be flexibly applied as a ‘device in the aid of justice.’”) (quoting
Cincinnati Car Co. v. New York Rapid Transit Corp., 66 F.2d 592, 595 (2d Cir. 1933)). See also
Maxwell, 86 F.3d at 1109–10 (finding that the district court’s instruction to the jury to calculate
damages in addition to a reasonable royalty to not be an abuse of discretion).
107 ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
108 Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
105
106
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10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial
embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to
those who have used the invention.
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any
evidence probative of the value of that use.
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in
the particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of
the invention or analogous inventions.
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention
as distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process,
business risks, or significant features or improvements added by the
infringer.
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts.
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as
the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began)
if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement;
that is, the amount which a prudent licensee- who desired, as a business
proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article
embodying the patented invention- would have been willing to pay as a
royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which amount would
have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a
license.
At least one commentator has noted that factor (15) is the ultimate determination
made by the fact-finder, supported by evidence of the applicable factors (1)–(14).109
Some courts have resisted applying Factor (1): “royalties received by the patentee for
the licensing of the patent in suit, proving or tending to prove an established
royalty,”110 arguing that the “risk and expense of litigation”111 skews the reasonable
royalty calculation.112 However, the Federal Circuit has noted that, in the absence of
other reliable evidence, litigation-derived licenses may be the best available indicator
of a starting point for a reasonable royalty calculation.113 Following the Federal

Janice M. Mueller, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW, P. 403 (2d ed. 2005).
Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
111 Rude v. Westcott, 130 U.S. 152, 164 (1889) (“The avoidance of the risk and expense of litigation
will always be a potential motive for a settlement.”).
112 See Am. Original Corp. v. Jenkins Food Corp., 774 F.2d 459, 464(Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that
a license derived from litigation “does not establish . . . the minimum reasonable royalty,” because “[a]
royalty at which a patentee offers to license his invention, particularly when coupled with a claim of
infringement, is not necessarily the same rate as that upon which a hypothetical willing licensee and
willing licensor would agree”).
113 ResQNet, 594 F.3d at 872.
109
110
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Circuit’s observation, courts have begun to more seriously consider the value of
litigation-derived licenses.114
Another method of calculating a reasonable royalty approved by the Federal
Circuit in TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 852 (1986), applies primarily when an infringer has calculated projected profits
prior to beginning infringement.115 In TWM, the Federal Circuit endorsed a royalty
rate based on the difference between the projected profit on the infringing product
(about 40%) and the industry standard net profit (about 10%). 116 Although internal
estimates of potential profit are not uncommon, they are not necessarily easy to obtain
or prove. The Georgia-Pacific analysis therefore remains the most common form of
reasonable royalty calculation.
B. Entire Market Value Rule
Reasonable royalty damages have two components: the royalty rate and the base
to which it is applied. The Georgia-Pacific analysis helps to establish the royalty
rate.117 The base may be sales of the infringing product or sales of a product
incorporating an infringing component. A major factor in determining the royalty base
is the “entire market value rule.” When it applies, the entire market value rule enables
a patentee to establish as the royalty base not just the patented component, but also
unrelated, unpatented items.118 These unpatented items fall into two categories:
“convoyed” sales (those that typically accompany a patented item) and “derivative”
sales (essentially spare parts). 119
Generally, the entire market value rule applies when: “(1) the infringing
components must be the basis for customer demand for the entire machine including
the parts beyond the claimed invention; (2) the individual infringing and noninfringing components must be sold together so that they constitute a functional unit
or are parts of a complete machine or single assembly of parts; and (3) the individual
infringing and non-infringing components must be analogous to a single functioning
unit. . . . Notably, these requirements are additive, not alternative ways to demonstrate
eligibility for application of the entire market value rule.”120
Of most importance to the present analysis is the application of the entire market
value rule to a product incorporating many separate components (or a product
incorporating many separate features), only one of which is covered by the particular
patent at issue. In Lucent Tech., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009),
the Federal Circuit tackled the task of calculating the reasonable royalty base for an
infringed patent that covered a method of “entering information on a computer screen
114 See Layne S. Keele, Res”Q”ing Patent Infringement Damages After ResQNet: The Dangers of
Litigation Licenses as Evidence of a Reasonable Royalty, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 181, 194 (2012).
115 TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986)
116 Id.
117 Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120
118 See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 382 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
119 Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal Equipment Innovations, Inc., 72 F.3d 872, 881 n. 8 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).
120 Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 286–87 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (Rader, J.
sitting by designation) (internal citations omitted).
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without using a keyboard.”121 The patent holder, Lucent Technologies, accused
Microsoft Outlook, Money, and Windows Mobile of infringing the patent. 122 At trial,
the jury awarded damages of over $350 million based on Microsoft’s infringement. 123
The jury applied the entire market value rule to the total sales value of the three
accused products, approximately $8 billion.124,125 The Federal Circuit rejected the jury’s
damages calculation.126
The Federal Circuit took exception to the application of the entire market value
rule for two reasons: first, the lack of nexus between the patented feature and
consumer demand for the accused products, 127 and second, the unreasonable
expectations for a royalty rate.128 As a general rule, the Court noted, there “is nothing
inherently wrong with using the market value of the entire product, especially when
there is no established market value for the infringing component or feature, so long
as the multiplier accounts for the proportion of the base represented by the infringing
component or feature.”129 The Court vacated the damages award and remanded for a
new trial on damages.130 At the subsequent trial, the jury awarded damages of $70
million.131 Following motions for judgment as a matter of law, the amount was reduced
to a grand total of approximately $41 million. 132
C. Private Standards
Understanding the entire market value rule is key to understanding the
application of reasonable royalty analyses in the private standards context. One of the
highest-profile cases in the private standard arena is the recent controversy between
Google and Microsoft as part of the so-called “smartphone wars.”133 Google, as the
121 Lucent Tech., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The patent at issue
was U.S. Patent No. 4,763,356.
122 Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1038.
123 Id. at 1039.
124 Id. at 1323.
125 It is unclear how exactly the jury arrived at its damages figure. On the jury form, it indicated
that it was a lump sum royalty payment rather than a running royalty. However, the damages amount
was given to the penny: $357,693,056.18. The Federal Circuit assumed that the jury applied the entire
market value rule to arrive at the number. Id. at 1336.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 1338 (“The date-picker tool’s minor role in the overall program is further confirmed when
one considers the relative importance of certain other features, e.g., e-mail.”).
128 Id. at 1338–39 (“Lucent’s expert tried to reach the damages number he would have obtained
had he used the price of the entire computer as a royalty base. Being precluded from using the
computer as the royalty base, he used the price of the software, but inflated the royalty rate
accordingly.”)
129 Id. at 1339. The Court was, in part, responding to criticism of the application of the entire
market value rule to the reasonable royalty context. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost
Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV 655 (2009).
130 Id. at 1340.
131 Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 837 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1111 (S.D. Cal. 2011).
132 Id. at 1127.
133 E.g., E. Robert Yoches, Lessons from the Smartphone Wars, Managing Intellectual Property,
Chinese
Edition
(Dec.
2012),
available
at
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=e0cc3946-20e3-4f96-ab5e534d60de33b4.
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owner of a portfolio of patents originally held by Motorola Mobility, 134 demanded
royalties from Microsoft in the hundreds of millions of dollars. 135 The patents at issue
covered two different communications standards: H.264 136 and 802.11.137,138
There are two key factors in Google’s ability to demand such a large royalty
amount. First, standards are essential to the operation of modern technological
devices.139 A smartphone that was unable to communicate over 802.11—the
communications standard used by wireless routers—would not be of much use to
consumers.140 Second, a smartphone, like many other electronic devices, implements a
vast array of standards.141
The first problem is referred to as patent “holdup.” 142 As the Microsoft court noted,
holdup “can threaten the diffusion of valuable standards and undermine the standardsetting process.” It also “harms consumers to the extent that those excess [royalty]
costs are passed onto them.”143 The second problem is known as patent “stacking.” This
occurs both when a single standard is covered by multiple patents and when a single
device implements multiple standards. Patent stacking runs the risk “of the use of
post-adoption leverage to exact excessive royalties [] compounded by the number of
potential licensors . . . .”144
To mitigate these issues, many standards-setting organizations implement patent
policies that require participating members to disclose any patents that might cover a
potential standard, and to make those patents available at a reasonable,
nondiscriminatory (“RAND”) royalty rate. 145 The standards-setting organizations
responsible for both the H.264 and 802.11 standards required patentees to offer
standards-essential patents at RAND rates.146 However, what “RAND” actually means
is not specified by the organizations and is left to the courts to decide. 147
In Microsoft v. Motorola, Judge Robart finally addressed this issue. According to
Judge Robart:
134 Parmy Olson Google Buys Motorola Mobility for $12.5B, Revs Up Patent Portfolio, Forbes.com
(Aug. 15, 2011), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2011/08/15/google-buysmotorola-mobility-for-12-5b-revs-up-patent-portfolio/.
135 See Susan Decker, Judge Cuts Google’s Motorola Royalty Demand to Microsoft,
BLOOMBERG.COM, (visited on Apr. 26, 2013 12:07 P.M.), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-0426/judge-cuts-google-s-motorola-royalty-demand-to-microsoft.html.
136 H.264 is a video compression standard created by the International Telecommunication Union,
the International Organization for Standardization, and the International Electrotechnical
Commission. It is widely used in the communication of high definition video. Int’l Telecommunication
Union, H.264: Advanced Video Coding for Generic Audiovisual Services, http://www.itu.int/rec/TREC-H.264.
137 802.11 is a wireless communication standard promulgated by the Institute of Electrical &
Electronics
Engineers
(“IEEE”).
IEEE,
IEEE
Get
Program,
http://standards.ieee.org/about/get/802/802.11.html.
138 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., et al., 2013 WL 2111217, (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013).
139 See, e.g., Microsoft, at *8.
140 Id.
141 Id. at *14.
142 Microsoft, at *10–11.
143 Id. at *10.
144 Id. at *11.
145 Id. at *9–11.
146 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217 at *6–9.
147 Id. at 9–10.
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[T]he hypothetical negotiation under a RAND obligation must be different
than the typical Georgia-Pacific analysis historically conducted by courts in
a patent infringement action. This is so for at least two reasons. First, the
owner of [a standards-essential patent (“SEP”)]148 is under the obligation to
license its patents on RAND terms, whereas the owner of a patent
uncommitted to RAND has monopoly power over its patent and may choose
to withhold licensing. Second, the hypothetical negotiation almost certainly
will not take place in a vacuum: the implementer of a standard will
understand that it must take a license from many SEP owners, not just one,
before it will be in compliance with its licensing obligations and able to fully
implement the standard.149
Thus, to Judge Robart, the willingness of a patentee to submit to the terms of a
standards-setting organization implies an abandonment of its normal patent-based
right to seek the highest market value possible for royalties. When a standards-setting
organization recognizes a patent as essential, royalties may be calculated only after
consideration of the number of other, related standard-essential patents. Judge
Robart, therefore, modified the Georgia-Pacific standards to account for the differences
inherent in a standards-driven environment.150
D. Public Standards
While Judge Robart’s analysis is welcome in the world of private standards, his
specific reasons for calculating the reasonable royalty are not necessarily applicable to
the world of public standards. Public standards do not yet have to cope with the
problem of patent stacking. For example, an automotive insurance company must
license far fewer patents than electronics and telecommunications industries. 151 For
usage-based insurance products, there may be only a single portfolio license
required.152,153 While this can be expensive, it is not unique to public standards.
Public standards also do not typically involve the explicit, contract-based
agreements characteristic of private standards. In the Microsoft example above,
148 Private standards-setting organizations use the term “essential” if a patent “is necessary to
implement either an optional or mandatory provision of a patent.” Id. at *15.
149 Id. at *16.
150 E.g., id. at *18 (in examining Factor 1, Judge Robart concluded that “past royalty rates for a
patent must be negotiated under the RAND obligation or a comparable negotiation. Thus, license
agreements where the parties clearly understood the RAND obligation, and . . . patent pools, will be
relevant to a hypothetical negotiation for SEPs.”).
151 See Section II.A; Microsoft, at *17 (noting evidence that standards “related to 802.11 Standard
‘generally is acknowledged to be in the thousands.’”).
152 See supra Section II.A.
153 This may not be the case for insurance companies that wish to manufacture (or have
manufactured for them) their own devices for use with a usage-based insurance product. As described
above in Section II.A, for example, Progressive’s Snapshot device allows for communication of
telematics data over a wireless network. This communication path is covered by the 802.11 standard.
However, as noted above, the private standards governing electronic devices have a distinct and
growing jurisprudence that does not necessarily implicate the same considerations as those governing
public standards.
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Motorola joined an agreement to offer its standards-essential patents at RAND
rates.154 Public standards instead rely on an implicit agreement between competitors:
that state agencies will act as the guardian of the customer’s interest.
The role of state agencies in this agreement strengthens the need to consider the
public interest in determining the cost of participation in a patent-controlled market.
It is one thing to consider “the benefits to those who have used the invention” 155
(Georgia-Pacific factor #10) when determining a royalty rate for Microsoft Outlook. It
is quite another to consider the public interest in determining an entry cost for a
market explicitly enabled by law.
However, the idea of explicitly considering a strong public interest seems to have
little place in a traditional “willing licensee/willing licensor”-style hypothetical
negotiation. In an ex ante negotiation, the public interest factor is entirely on the side
of the licensor and provides little leverage against a licensee whose business has
already been permitted by legislation. In markets traditionally subject to patent
licensing negotiations, there is substantially more room to offer a slightly different
product or compete in a slightly different way that may, even theoretically, avoid the
patents at issue. There is no requirement, for example, that any smartphone
manufacturer implement the H.264 standard; it is just better for their business for
them to do so.156
In the case of public standards, there are fewer options. There may be some room
to “design around” a patent and still comply with regulation, but there may not be. 157
The negotiating power in a hypothetical negotiation is incredibly asymmetric. As a
result, a court considering a reasonable royalty calculation must be willing to modify
the Georgia-Pacific factors to accommodate the strong public interest inherent in
public standard patents.
To paraphrase Judge Robart then, there is one question left to be answered: what
factors should a court force a patent owner and public standard-implementer to
consider during such a hypothetical negotiation?158
IV. A HYPOTHETICAL NEGOTIATION FOR A PUBLIC STANDARD.
As discussed above in Section III.A, there are fifteen enumerated factors in the
traditional Georgia-Pacific reasonable royalty analysis.159 However, not all of them
may be applicable to a given case.160 For example, in the Microsoft v. Motorola case,

Microsoft, at *8.
Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
156 See Microsoft, at *9.
157 See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
158 See Microsoft, at *17 (“With respect to methodology, there is one question left to be answered:
what factors would [a standard-essential patent] owner and standard-implementer consider during
such a hypothetical negotiation?”).
159 Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
160 Id. at 1119–21.
154
155
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Judge Robart’s modified factors161 may be summarized as described below in Table
3.162
TABLE 3
Factor #

Description

Modification

1

Royalties received for
licensing the patent in
suit
Importance of patented
invention to licensor and
licensee’s sales
Advantages over other
alternatives
Benefits to the infringer

Limited to RAND agreements163

6, 8
9
10, 11
12

Customary royalty
values in the industry

13

Portion of profit
attributable to invention
Amount parties would
have agreed to a priori

15

Limited to value of component
invention, not the standard itself 164
Limited to consideration of alternative
prior to standard’s adoption165
Focused on the value of the
component invention more so than the
standard itself.166
Limited to “customary practices of
businesses licensing RANDcommitted patents.”167
Limited to value of component
invention, not the standard itself.168
Must reflect the RAND “commitment
of widespread adoption of the
standard through avoidance of holdup
and stacking.”169

Not all of these modifications are as applicable to the realm of public standards.
For example, absent the concerns over patent holdup, the modifications to factors 6, 8,
10, and 11 have less force.170 Judge Robart’s opinion illustrates how a court may apply
the Georgia-Pacific analysis to a specific business context when that context is
sufficiently understood.
With respect to public standards, potential modifications look quite different. The
proposed modifications below attempt to balance two competing realities: public

161 Judge Robart’s Georgia-Pacific analysis arguably does not modify the traditional factors, but
merely applies them to a RAND-specific context. However, I use the term here given the Judge’s use
of the word “modified,” see supra note 150.
162 Microsoft, at *18–20.
163 Id. at *18.
164 Id. at *18. Arguably this is not a modification of factors (6) and (8), but rather an application
of the entire market value rule. See supra Section III.B.
165 Id. at *19.
166 Id. at *19.
167 Id. at *19.
168 Id. at *19.
169 Id. at *20.
170 See supra notes 151–56 and accompanying text.
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standard patentees hold a valid171 right to exclude others from the patented invention,
but the ability of any party to practice the patented invention arises entirely from
public legislation. This tension almost places the public in the shoes of the licensor.
Any reasonable royalty calculation must incorporate the public interest into the fabric
of the analysis. The sections below examine the most relevant of the reasonable royalty
factors.
A. Factor 1: Royalties Received for Licensing the Patent in Suit
It is unclear how this factor might apply to public standard litigation. As noted
above, the number of patents covering a standard may be relatively small. 172 Further,
the licenses that are available may be litigation-based, which the Federal Circuit has
recognized may be of limited evidentiary value.173 With the example of usage-based
automobile insurance, the most relevant license data point would be the license
between Progressive and USAA discussed in Section II.A, above. Even this license
may be of limited use, however, due to its terms requiring delay in implementing any
competing usage-based products.174
One approach to applying in Factor 1 to public standards is to look for elements
in prior licensing agreements that comport with the public interest. For example, in
considering the license between Progressive and USAA, a court may consider
whether it is more important to the public that a particular market have as many
competitors as quickly as possible (thus driving down prices) or to have competitors
paying a lower up-front rate in the hopes that the savings will be passed on to
consumers. If the former, the analysis may allow for a higher, flat-rate royalty. If the
latter, more creative alternatives may be considered such as a rate that rises over
time.
B. Factors 4–5: Licensor’s Monopoly Policy
Factors 4–5 weigh most heavily in the patentee’s favor. Factor 4 considers the
patentee’s licensing program. In Microsoft, Judge Robart considers Factor 4
inapplicable “because the licensor has made a commitment to license on RAND terms
and may no longer maintain a patent monopoly by not licensing to others.” 175 As
discussed above,176 this may not be the case with public standards. Indeed,
Progressive’s example illustrates precisely what Factor 4 attempts to capture: a
consistent policy of attempting to maintain a patent monopoly “by granting licenses
under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.”177 A sophisticated public
171 Once issued, a patent is presumed valid. 35 U.S.C. § 282. Invalidity must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence. See Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1461, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
172 See supra Section II.A.
173 See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text.
174 Id.
175 Microsoft, at *18.
176 See supra Section II.A.
177 Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120. Progressive’s 2013 offered license required that any
licensee forestall offering its own products prior to 2015, and gave Progressive a potential right of
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standard patentee may well take advantage of a policy similar to Progressive’s in order
to establish a strong monopoly policy.
Factor 5 considers the “commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee,
such as whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of
business.”178 A greater monetary range is allowed between competitors. Typically, a
licensing arrangement touching on public standards would be between or among
competitors.
C. Factors 6, 8, 9: Advantages Over Old Modes
Factors 6 and 8 reflect the importance of the patented invention to the sales
(including those of convoyed and derivative products) of the parties. 179 Factor 6
considers the value of the invention “in promoting sales of other products,” while Factor
8 analyzes the “established profitability of the product made under the patent; its
commercial success; and its current popularity.” 180 Factor 9 contemplates the “utility
and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices.” 181
Application of all three factors should focus on currently available alternatives to
the patented version of the public standard. If no alternatives exist—if the patent
completely preempts the standard—then public interest in the competitive availability
of the invention should weigh more heavily. If alternatives do exist, then these
alternatives should be taken into account and the patentee allowed a greater royalty
rate.
The Microsoft analysis in the private-standard sphere requires that the Factor 9
analysis consider only “alternatives that could have been written into the standard
instead of the patented technology.”182 In the public standard context, one must first
define what is meant by “alternatives.” Judge Robart compares competing technical
solutions to a problem presented by the standards-setting organization when
considering his royalty calculation. 183 Public standards, however, may not arise in a
similar manner.184
For example, usage-based insurance products are, strictly speaking,
“alternatives” to traditional insurance premium plans. However, when comparing
traditional premiums to usage-based products, the advantages the latter are rather
significant. As Professor Vickrey noted forty-five years ago, “the manner in which
[automobile insurance] premiums are computed and paid fails miserably to bring home
to the automobile user the costs he imposes in a manner that will appropriately
recognition. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., Progressive® Insurance and United Services
Automobile Association (USAA) Enter License Agreement for Usage-Based Insurance (June 28, 2013),
available at http://www.progressive.com/newsroom/article/2013/June/usaa-ubi/.
178 Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Microsoft, at *19.
183 Id.
184 The example of the patented oil and gas product patented by Unocal is more analogous to the
rise of private standards. In that case, different technical alternatives were considered before settling
on Unocal’s product. See supra Section II.D.2.
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influence his decision.”185 It may be more accurate, however, to compare usage-based
alternatives. For example, the MileMeter program offers a different way to go about
establishing a usage-based insurance program.186 When they are available, it is
preferable to focus on standard-competing alternatives rather than standard-replacing
alternatives.
D. Factor 10: Benefit to Invention Users
Factor 10 credits “the benefits to those who have used the invention.”187 In a
typical reasonable royalty calculation, identifying benefits to those who have used the
invention works in favor of the patentee. In a public standard context, however, the
public benefit has been articulated and implemented through public legislation.188 As
a result, Factor 10 may be used as the doctrinal basis for explicitly considering the
public interest.
E. Factor 12: Customary Profit
The “portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the
particular business or in comparable business to allow for the use of the invention”
helps to give a baseline for a royalty calculation. 189 In the Microsoft case, the court held
that this inquiry should be limited to “business practices involving RAND
commitments.”190
It is unclear how this requirement would work in the public standard realm. Given
the relatively small number of applicable patents, 191 there may not be any available
comparisons.
F. Factor 15: The Hypothetical Negotiation
“Factor 15 considers the amount that a licensor and a licensee would have agreed
upon (at the time infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily
trying to reach an agreement.”192 Factor 15 allows a fact-finder to bring together all of
the evidence contributed by the other factors in order to determine a reasonable royalty
rate and make any final adjustments necessary. 193 In addition to Factor 10, Factor 15
provides the foundation through which the public interest can most clearly be
incorporated.
185 William Vickrey, Automobile Accidents, Tort Law, Externalities, & Insurance: An Economist’s
Critique, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 464 (1968).
186 See supra notes 49–56 and accompanying text.
187 Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
188 See, e.g., supra note 73 and accompanying text.
189 Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
190 Microsoft, at *19.
191 See supra Section II.A.
192 Microsoft, at *20.
193 See supra note108.
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As the Federal Circuit has noted, strict adherence to the “willing licensor/willing
licensee” theory can lead to “absurd” results. 194 Courts have used Factor 15 to adjust a
preliminary reasonable royalty calculation to fit the particular facts of a case. 195 Factspecific context should include the interest of the public in ensuring competition for
publicly-enabled goods and services.
As discussed above, in the context of public standards, the “willing licensor/willing
licensee” paradigm suffers from dramatic leverage asymmetry. 196 A potential licensee
may have no idea that a particular market will be covered by a patent when that
market is enabled. This differs markedly from a purely private-enterprise situation in
which a company wants to enter a new market. That company may study the patent
landscape and decide on an approach other than that covered by the patent. With a
public standard, that alternative approach may be against the law.
G. Conclusion
The nature of public standard patents requires that courts give special attention
to the interests of the public when determining patent infringement damages. Courts
should consider the nature of the standard—whether alternatives exist to
implementation,197 whether the enabling body considered alternatives prior to
enactment,198 etc.—as well as protecting the public’s interest in promoting competition
in publicly-enabled markets.199
The court in Microsoft v. Motorola showed how a traditional damages calculation
could be adapted to the context of a private standard.200 An analogous tailoring process
would serve the public standard sphere well.
V. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
One of the difficulties in implementing a public interest-focused approach to a
reasonable royalty calculation is the question of who will advocate for the public
interest or even what, exactly, the “public interest” might be. Given the leverage
asymmetries of the hypothetical negotiation, one would expect that a licensee would
invoke the public interest in pleadings. It is perhaps easy to imagine that the interests
of a party in the midst of controversy might not perfectly align with the public interest.
One approach may be for judges, when faced with public standard patents, to call
for the opinion of the state attorney general or other interested parties. Although rare,

194 See supra notes102–05 and accompanying text; Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d
1538, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing State Indus. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir.
1989).
195 See supra note105 and accompanying text.
196 See supra Section III.B.3.
197 See supra notes 73–78 and accompanying text.
198 See supra notes 178–86 and accompanying text.
199 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
200 See supra Section III.
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trial courts may entertain amici briefs according to their discretion.201 Patent damages
cases are not typically within the realm of attorneys general. However, some states
have made noise recently about their desire to participate in some of the more highprofile patent issues.202 The ability of insurance companies to compete for a lucrative
new product may be something that states themselves would take an interest in.
Further, the call for amici need not be limited to state agents. Consumer groups, trade
industry groups, etc. might all be enlisted to provide balance to the leverage
asymmetry.
A similar issue exists in determining the extent to which a patent or portfolio of
patents covers a public standard. As discussed above in Section IV, certain of the
Georgia-Pacific factors may turn on whether or not a patent wholly preempts the
ability to practice a public standard.203 This type of analysis fits more squarely within
the realm of a trial court’s competence. The determination would require a combination
of patent claim construction and statutory interpretation. A court could schedule a
hearing on the issue of available alternatives prior to determining damages.
One additional practical consideration includes giving courts greater comfort with
this explicit consideration of the public interest in what is theoretically a hypothetical
negotiation between two private parties. One approach would be for states to require
public standard patentees to offer any patents that cover a public standard at RAND
rates. This would have the advantage of making the RAND analysis an explicit term
to which a patentee agreed.204
Moving away from implementation, a looming issue in the realm of private
standards is exactly what it means for a patent to be “standard essential” for the
purposes of a reasonable royalty analysis. In the standards at issue in the Microsoft
case, the standards-setting organizations themselves defined the term “essential.” 205
However, other patents may cover features of a standard that, while not “essential,”
are nevertheless required in order to make a product commercially viable. If the
modified Georgia-Pacific analysis crafted by Judge Robart stands, it remains to be seen
how far it may be applied to patents outside the rarified air of essentialness.
With regard to public standards, the same consideration awaits. For example, for
usage-based insurance, a court may determine that a particular portfolio (e.g.,
Progressive’s portfolio) completely covers the business aspects of practicing a public
201 Strougo v. Scudder, Stevens & Clark, Inc., 1997 WL 273566 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1997) (“Federal
courts have discretion to permit participation of amici where such participation will not prejudice any
party and may be of assistance to the court.”) (citing Vulcan Society of New York City Fire Dept.’, Inc.
v. Civil Service Comm’n, 490 F.2d 387, 391 (2d Cir. 1973).
202 For example, the Attorneys General of Minnesota, Vermont, and Nebraska have all initiated
legal action against so-called “patent troll” MPHJ and its representatives. Timothy B. Lee, Nebraska’
Attorney General Has Declared War On Patent Trolls, The Washington Post—The Switch, Sept. 12,
2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/12/nebraskas-attorney-generalhas-declared-war-on-patent-trolls/. In a filing with the District of Nebraska, the Nebraska Attorney
General argues that the “public interest will be served by the duly elected office of the state, the
attorney general, being allowed to continue his investigation pursuant to his statutory authority.”
Activision TV, Inc. v. Pinnacle Bancorp, Inc. et al., Case No. 8:13CV00215 (D. Neb.), Docket No. 22, p.
37.
203 See supra Section IV and accompanying text.
204 See supra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing the explicit agreements of private
standard companies to offer standard-essential patents at RAND rates).
205 See Microsoft, at *6–7.

[14:199 2015]

Public Standards and Patent Damages

227

standard. However, these patents may not cover the technology required to actually
implement those business aspects (e.g., the telematics device). It remains to be
determined how far courts will extend their authority to patents outside the currently
defined realm of “standard essential.”
VI. CONCLUSION
Some markets require legislation in order to exist. For example, the oil and gas
industry and the automobile insurance industry are heavily regulated, and new
products and services often require legislative and/or regulatory approval before they
may be offered to the general public. 206 When those new products or services are
covered by one or more letters patent, a situation arises in which a private party owns
a right to exclude others from participating in that publicly-enabled market.207 These
situations may be referred to “public standards.”
Like their cousins in the private sector, public standards require special
consideration when it comes to determining potential compensation to the patentee
from its competitors.208 Following the lead of the Western District of Washington, this
paper has presented a recommendation for a modification of the traditional GeorgiaPacific reasonable royalty formulation for a patent damages calculation. 209
Specifically, calculating damages for public standard patents requires an explicit,
thorough consideration of the public interest in addition to the patents themselves and
the relationship of the involved parties.210 Only then will the interests of the public be
adequately protected.

See supra Section II.
See supra Section II.A.
208 See supra Sections III–IV.
209 Id.
210 Id.
206
207

